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Abstract
We examine how vertical separation aﬀects the lobbying activities for the access
charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of
new entrants is ﬁxed, we ﬁnd that vertical separation either increases or decreases the
access charge, and that this depends on the relative eﬃciency between the incumbent
and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Second, when investigating a free-
entry market, we ﬁnd that vertical separation always reduces the access charge in such
a market. The vertically integrated ﬁrm has a stronger incentive to lobby in this market
because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.
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11 Introduction
Competition between a ﬁrm holding essential facilities (usually, a dominant ﬁrm) and ﬁrms
not holding them has been widely observed in many industries such as overnight delivery,
telecommunications, electric power, and natural gas distribution. In particular, in Japan,
dominant ﬁrms are not vertically separated in telecommunications, electric power, and gas
distribution. Dominant ﬁrms were previously legal monopolists, and they have had to
compete against new entrants after the liberalization of these markets. New entrants pay
an access fee to the dominant ﬁrms. The access charge (the price of using essential facilities
that is also an input price for new entrants) aﬀects the new entrants’ marginal costs, and
thus signiﬁcantly aﬀects the performance of the markets.
The access charge is typically regulated by the government. Considerable literature on
the desirable and/or existing rules for levying the access charge, such as eﬃcient component
pricing rule (ECPR), total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC), and a historical
cost approach, exist;1 moreover, currently, charges based on the costs of essential facilities
are levied all over the world. For example, in Japan, TELRIC has been adopted in tra-
ditional local telecommunications, while the historical cost approach has been adopted in
optical ﬁber networks, electric power, and natural gas distribution. In the EU, although
the rules are diﬀerent for diﬀerent countries, cost-based approaches have been adopted in
most industries and in most countries.
In practice, however, ﬁrms often inﬂuence the access charge by lobbying and/or manipu-
lating the accounting costs, whereas in principle, the rule for calculating the access charge is
determined by a neutral government, and there is no room for manipulation.2 For example,
1 For the general aspects of the access charge, see Vogelsang (2003) and Rey and Tirole (2007). See
also Laﬀont and Tirole (1994), Economides and White (1995), Hausman (1997), Armstrong and Vickers
(1998), Ida (2001), Sappington (2006), and Higgins and Mukherjee (2010). Further, see Hori and Mizuno
(2006), Mizuno and Shinkai (2006), Ida and Anbashi (2008), and Gautier and Mitra (2008) for the dynamic
eﬃciency of access charge rules.
2For discussions on these activities in the general context of regulation policies, see Viscusi et al. (2005).
2in Japan, integrated gas companies insisted that the costs of vaporizers and pumps of liqui-
dated natural gas (LNG) tanks should be included in the access charge accounting for gas
distribution pipeline networks. They made substantial eﬀorts to rationalize their argument
in front of the Gas Energy Committee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resource
and Energy, which is the agency that determines the rules for access charge accounting.
Eventually, they succeeded in persuading the committee to adopt a resolution to include
these costs in the current access charge. Similar instances have been widely observed in
telecommunications and electric power distribution in Japan. In this paper, we consider a
situation wherein the access charge is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrms through lobbying activities.
Another important topic in policy is whether dominant ﬁrms should be allowed to hold
essential facilities. Vertical separation is always an important policy issue in this ﬁeld, and
ownership unbundling has been widely observed, especially in the EU. It is often insisted
that vertical separation is beneﬁcial because it deters manipulation by vertically integrated
ﬁrms.
In this paper, we discuss the manner in which vertical separation aﬀects the access
charge. First, we formulate a model where n ﬁrms compete in a ﬁnal product market and
one monopoly input supplier, ﬁrm 0, holds an essential facility. We compare two situations,
ﬁrms 0 and 1 are vertically integrated (vertical integration case), and no ﬁrm is vertically
integrated (vertical separation case).
We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of vertical separation on lobbying activities are ambiguous. It
depends on the number of ﬁrms and the cost structure. When the number of ﬁrms is large,
vertical separation decreases (increases) the lobbying activities and consequently the access
charge if the incumbent is more eﬃcient than or as eﬃcient as the new entrants (if the
incumbent is considerably less eﬃcient than the new entrants). On the contrary, when the
number of ﬁrms is small, vertical separation increases (decrease) the access charge if the
incumbent is more eﬃcient than or as eﬃcient as the new entrants (if the incumbent is
considerably less eﬃcient than the new entrants). We also discuss the welfare eﬀects. We
3ﬁnd that vertical separation can be harmful for welfare.
Second, we investigate a free-entry market of new entrants.3 We obtain a contrasting
clear-cut result. We ﬁnd that vertical separation reduces the access charge in the free-entry
market. The vertically integrated ﬁrm has a stronger incentive to increase the access charge
in a free-entry market because a higher access charge reduces the number of competitors.
Such a strategic eﬀect disappears under vertical separation.
We now review related papers. The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship
between the incentive to raise the access charge and vertical separation/integration.4 In the
literature on vertically related industries, many works have already pointed out that verti-
cally integrated ﬁrms have strong incentives to raise their rivals’ costs. Economides (1998)
investigates Cournot competition in a downstream market and shows that the vertically
integrated ﬁrm has an incentive to exclude the rivals through a prohibitive access charge.
Mandy and Sappington (2007) show that the vertically integrated ﬁrm has an incentive
to engage in cost-increasing sabotage regardless of whether there is Cournot or Bertrand
competition in the downstream market, but has a weak (strong) incentive to engage in
demand-reducing sabotage when there is Bertrand (Cournot) competition. The discussions
on increasing the rivals’ costs and cost-increasing sabotage in this context are also pro-
vided by Beard et al. (2001) (see also the papers cited by them). Bustos and Galetovic
(2009) discuss a case in which a bottleneck monopoly endogenously determines its vertical
structure (integration or separation) and the degree of sabotage.
The setting of lobbing activity in this paper is closely related to the cost-increasing
sabotage discussed in the previous researches, but there is one crucial diﬀerence. Under
vertical separation, the upstream ﬁrm has no incentive to engage in sabotage activities
because these activities never increase the revenue of the upstream ﬁrm (Beard et al. (2001)
and Mandy and Sappington (2007)). Thus, vertical separation never facilitates sabotage
3 Free entry markets often yield completely diﬀerent economic implications (Lahiri and Ono (1995),
Davidson and Mukherjee (2007), Etro (2007), Marjit and Mukherjee (2008), and Ino and Matsumura (2010)).
4 Armstrong and Sappington (2006) provide a comprehensive survey for deregulation policy.
4activities. On the contrary, the vertically separated upstream ﬁrm still has an incentive to
lobby because an increase in the access charge can increase its proﬁts. As a result, vertical
separation can facilitate lobbying activities. Another diﬀerence is that all works mentioned
above assume that the number of ﬁrms is given exogenously, while we consider a free-entry
market.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model and
provides the basic calculus to derive the main result. Section 3 presents the main results.
Section 4 discusses a free-entry market. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider two cases: (1) a vertically integrated ﬁrm holding an essential facility and
(2) vertical separation undertaken by the government. We call the ﬁrm holding an es-
sential facility the integrated (separated) facility ﬁrm in the integration (separation) case,
respectively.
2.1 Vertical integration case
We consider an oligopoly model. Firm 1 is an integrated facility ﬁrm, and ﬁrm i (i =
2;:::;n) is a new entrant. Firm i accesses the essential facility held by ﬁrm 1 and pays ayi
to ﬁrm 1, where a is the per unit access charge and yi is ﬁrm i’s output.6
In the ﬁrst stage, the access charge (input price) a is determined. Let L(a) denote ﬁrm
1’s eﬀort costs (costs incurred for the lobbying activity, manipulation of the access charge
5 The model formulation is also related to that in Buehler et al. (2006). They consider the eﬀects of policy
instruments to a public utility which supplies an essential input to downstream ﬁrms and engages in quality
investment: (i) market structure regulation (vertical separation/integration with downstream competition
and monopoly vertical integration) and (ii) access charge regulation. They mainly focus on how vertical
separation/integration with downstream competition and the level of access charge change the price in the
downstream market and the service quality. This is diﬀerent from the main concern in our paper.
6 In many countries, the sales and production departments of a vertically integrated ﬁrm pay ay1 to their
own network department that holds the essential facilities. However, this accounting system does not aﬀect
the optimal output in an integrated ﬁrm as long as it maximizes the joint proﬁt of both departments.
5accounting, etc.). We implicitly assume that the per unit access charge is zero if ﬁrm 1 does
not make any eﬀort. That is, the access charge is regulated but can be aﬀected by ﬁrm 1’s
eﬀorts. Moreover, we only consider the cases in which only the integrated/separated facility
ﬁrm engages in lobbying activities. This is because we would like to clarify how vertical
integration/separation aﬀects ﬁrm 1’s incentive to lobby. In the discussion on lobbying
activities, this simple functional form is often employed. For instance, Long and Soubeyran
(1996), Pecorino (1998), and Yamazaki (2004) among others assume that in the context
of international trade, the tariﬀ rate t is a function of the domestic ﬁrms’ total lobbying
eﬀorts/expenditures or the industry-wide labor devoted to lobbying, and that the tariﬀ
function t = t(Z) satisﬁes t0 > 0 and t00 < 0, where Z =
Pn
i=1 zi, and zi is the eﬀective
lobbying eﬀort/expenditure of the domestic ﬁrm i. We think that this simple assumption
clariﬁes how the main results in this paper are derived.7
In the second stage, the ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition. They simultaneously
produce perfectly homogeneous products for which the market demand function is given
by p(Y ) = v ¡ Y , where v is a positive constant and Y is the total output of the ﬁrms
(price as a function of quantity). Firm i’s production cost (except for the access charge) is
normalized to zero and ﬁrm 1’s marginal production cost is denoted by c. If c is positive
(negative), ﬁrm 1 is less (more) eﬃcient than ﬁrm i (i = 2;:::;n). Firm 1’s proﬁt and ﬁrm
i’s proﬁt are given as (i = 2;:::;n)
¼1 = (p(Y ) ¡ c)y1 + a
n X
j=2
yj ¡ L(a); ¼i = (p(Y ) ¡ a)yi:
We assume that L0(a) ¸ 0 and that L00(a) > 0 in order to ensure the concavity of
7 It might be possible to formulate these lobbying activities by other models. For instance, lobbying
activities are often formulated by the rent-seeking model of Tullock (1980), which is also related to patent
race games (e.g., Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and Clark et al. (2010)). In these models, it is
often assumed that each player engages in lobbying activities and that the winner of the rent-seeking game
(patent race game) is probabilistically determined. As the eﬀort (investment) level of a player increases,
his/her winning probability increases. This property is somewhat similar to that formulated in this paper
although the access charge is deterministically set by the eﬀort level of the integrated/separated facility
ﬁrm.
6ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ function. We assume that L0(0) = 0 in order to ensure interior solutions in
the ﬁrst stage. We also assume interior solutions in the second stage (production stage)
discussed below.
Consider the second stage. The reaction functions of the ﬁrms in the second stage are
given by
R1(Y¡1) =










The resulting equilibrium outputs and proﬁts are as follows (i = 2;3;:::;n):
yIS
1 =




v + c ¡ 2a
n + 1










(v ¡ nc + (n ¡ 1)a)2
(n + 1)2 +




(v ¡ 2a + c)2
(n + 1)2 :
where the superscript IS denotes the equilibrium outcome under vertical integration in the
second stage. The resulting total social surplus (consumer surplus plus the proﬁts of the
ﬁrms) is given by8
WIS =
(nv ¡ c ¡ (n ¡ 1)a)((n + 2)v + c + (n ¡ 1)a)
2(n + 1)2 ¡
c(v ¡ nc + (n ¡ 1)a)
n + 1
¡ L(a): (1)
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 1 maximizes ¼IS





2(n ¡ 1)(v ¡ nc + (n ¡ 1)a)
(n + 1)2 +
(n ¡ 1)(v + c ¡ 4a)
n + 1
¡ L0(a) = 0: (2)
Let the superscript I denote the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes under
vertical integration. aI is derived from (2).
2.2 Vertical separation case
We consider the situation wherein vertical separation is undertaken by the government. In
the previous subsection, ﬁrm 1 holds the essential facility and supplies the ﬁnal products.
In this subsection, ﬁrms 0 and 1 are separated. Firm 0 holds the essential facility but does
not supply the ﬁnal products. It obtains access revenue from n ﬁrms including ﬁrm 1.
8 If the lobbying costs are not real social costs but only income transfers from the ﬁrm to the regulators
or lawyers, it might be better not to subtract L(a) in (1).
7In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm 0 chooses a with cost L(a): After observing a, n ﬁrms compete in
terms of output. Firm 0’s proﬁt, ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt, and ﬁrm i’s proﬁt are given by (i = 2;:::;n)
¼0 = a ¢
n X
i=1
yi ¡ L(a); ¼1 = (p(Y ) ¡ c ¡ a)y1; ¼i = (p(Y ) ¡ a)yi:
Again, in the second stage, n ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition.
We discuss the second stage subgame where a is given exogenously. The equilibrium
outputs are as follows (i = 2;3;:::;n):
ySS
1 =




v + c ¡ a
n + 1
; Y SS =
nv ¡ c ¡ na
n + 1
;
where the superscript SS denotes the equilibrium outcome under vertical separation in the
second stage. The resulting proﬁts of the ﬁrms are given by (i = 2;3;:::;n)
¼SS
0 =




(v ¡ nc ¡ a)2
(n + 1)2 ; ¼SS
i =
(v + c ¡ a)2
(n + 1)2 :
The resulting total social surplus is given by
WSS =
(nv ¡ c ¡ na)((n + 2)v + c + na)
2(n + 1)2 ¡
c(v ¡ nc ¡ a)
n + 1
¡ L(a):






nv ¡ c ¡ 2na
n + 1
¡ L0(a) = 0: (3)
Let the superscript S denote the SPNE outcomes under vertical separation. aS is derived
from (3).
3 Results
We now present the results.
Proposition 1 (i) If n < 3, there exists ˜ c(n) such that aS > aI if and only if c < ˜ c(n):
(ii) If n = 3, aS = aI regardless of c.
(iii) If n > 3, there exists ¯ c(n) such that aS > aI if and only if c > ¯ c(n).
8Proof: See Appendix.
The following ﬁgures are helpful for understanding Proposition 1. In the ﬁgures, ¯ ¼i
indicates the proﬁt of ﬁrm i before subtracting lobbying cost L(a). @¯ ¼IS
1 =@a and @¯ ¼SS
0 =@a
respectively denote the marginal gains of raising a for the facility ﬁrms in the integration
and the separation cases. L0(a) denotes the marginal cost of raising a in both cases. Figures
1(a), 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d) indicate the cases in which n is small and c is large, both n and
c are large, both n and c are small, and n is large and c is small, respectively. They show
the equilibrium access charge levels in each case.
[Figure 1 here]
A key property behind Proposition 1 is that the slope of @¯ ¼=@a depends on the number of
ﬁrms. Figure 1 shows that j@2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2j > j@2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2j (resp. j@2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2j < j@2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2j)
holds if n is large (resp. small). We now discuss the intuition behind this property.
We rewrite the marginal gains of raising a for the facility ﬁrms in the two cases (inte-




































We call the ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst equation “the strategic eﬀect.” This represents the
incentive of the integrated facility ﬁrm for reducing its rivals’ outputs. We call the remaining
eﬀects in the two equations “the input-market eﬀect.” This represents the incentives of the
facility ﬁrms in both cases for obtaining access charge revenues. Note that in the separation
case, only the input-market eﬀect exists.
We now investigate the condition that j@2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2j > j@2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2j. First, we discuss
the input-market eﬀect. In both integration and separation cases, a higher a leads to a
lower output of ﬁrms paying the access charge (we call them service-based ﬁrms) because
it increases their marginal costs (direct eﬀect). In the integration case, a higher a leads
9to a higher output of ﬁrm 1, and it further reduces the total output of the service-based
ﬁrms (indirect eﬀect), while no such additional indirect eﬀect exists in the separation case.
This means that an increase in a reduces the total output of service-based ﬁrms more
in the integration case than in the separation case. Thus, an increase in a weakens the
input-market eﬀect more in the integration case than in the separation case. Therefore,
j@2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2j > j@2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2j holds unless the input-market eﬀect is dominated by the strate-
gic eﬀect, which is discussed below.
Next, we discuss the strategic eﬀect. There is no strategic eﬀect in the separation case.
However, in the integration case, a higher a leads to a higher yIS
1 (a), which strengthens
the strategic eﬀect. In other words, an increase in a enhances the marginal gain of raising
a from the strategic eﬀect. Therefore, j@2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2j < j@2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2j holds as long as the
strategic eﬀect dominates the input-market eﬀect discussed above.
We now discuss how n aﬀects these two eﬀects. An increase in n increases the total out-
put of service-based ﬁrms. Thus, it strengthens the input-market eﬀect. The eﬀect on the




and strengthens the strategic eﬀect. On the other hand, an increase in n reduces yIS
1 (a) and
weakens the strategic eﬀect. The above two eﬀects are mutually canceled out, and the net
eﬀect is weak. Under these conditions, the input-market eﬀect is more likely to dominate
the strategic eﬀect when n is larger. Hence, j@2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2j > j@2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2j holds unless n is
small enough.
Another key property behind Proposition 1 is that the intersection of the two curves of
marginal gains in the two cases is ((v ¡ nc)=2;(n ¡ 1)c). The location of the intersection
depends on the eﬃciency of ﬁrm 1, c, and the number of ﬁrms, n. A decrease in c shifts the
two curves of marginal gains toward the northeast. The shift of @¯ ¼SS
1 =@a is larger (resp.
smaller) than that of @¯ ¼IS
0 =@a when n is small (resp. large). The shifts of the two curves
induce the intersection to move toward the southeast (compare (a) with (c), and (b) with
(d)). We explain the intuition behind the property of these shifts.
10First, we explain how a decrease in c increases the marginal gains in both cases and
yields the upward shifts of both curves, @¯ ¼SS
1 =@a and @¯ ¼IS
0 =@a. A higher eﬃciency of the
integrated facility ﬁrm (a lower c) leads to its higher quantity yIS
1 (a). The strategic eﬀect is
strong when the quantity supplied by the integrated facility ﬁrm (yIS
1 (a)) is large. Thus, a
decrease in c strengthens the strategic eﬀect in the integration case, resulting in an upward
shift of the curve, @¯ ¼IS
0 =@a. In the separation case, a lower c leads to a higher total output
of the service-based ﬁrms (
Pn
i=1 ySS
i (a)). A lower c implies that the average of the ﬁrms’
marginal costs is smaller. As Salant and Shaﬀer (1999) show, it yields a larger total output.
Thus, a decrease in c strengthens the input-market eﬀect in the separation case, resulting
in an upward shift of the curve, @¯ ¼SS
1 =@a.
Next, we explain how a decrease in c yields a smaller shift of the curve in the separation
case when n is large. The impact of a decrease in c on the average marginal cost is smaller
when n is large, and consequently, the marginal gain in the separation case is less sensitive
to c. On the contrary, in the integration case, the impact of a decrease in c on the strategic
eﬀect is stronger when n is large. The impact of a decrease in c on yIS
1 is stronger when
n is larger. In fact, j@yIS
1 =@cj = n=(n + 1), and this is increasing in n. The rest of the
parts consisting the strategic eﬀect do not depend on c.9 As a result, the marginal gain
in the integration case is more sensitive to c when n is large. Under these conditions, the
upward shift of the curve, @¯ ¼IS
0 =@a, which is caused by a decrease of c in the integration
case, dominates that of @¯ ¼SS
1 =@a in the separation case when n is large, resulting in the
right-down shift of the intersection (see Figures 1(b) and 1(d)).
We brieﬂy discuss the welfare implications of vertical separation. Vertical separation
yields a double-marginalization problem in ﬁrm 1 and reduces its output. Although it
increases the other ﬁrms’ outputs, the total output decreases by vertical separation. Given
a, vertical separation reduces y1 and Y , and hence reduces welfare. Suppose that c · 0:
9 This property would depend on the assumption of the inverse demand function. We consider that the
weak relation between the rest of the parts and c holds, even though we use a more general inverse demand
function.
11According to Proposition 1(i), vertical separation increases a when n = 2, which results in a
welfare loss. Because both eﬀects reduce welfare, vertical separation unambiguously reduces
welfare. When n = 3, the second eﬀect disappears, but the ﬁrst eﬀect is still present. Thus,
vertical separation unambiguously reduces welfare when n = 3. These yield the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 If n · 3, vertical separation reduces welfare when c · 0.
When c is positive, however, the implications on welfare are ambiguous even when n · 3.
When c is large, a reduction in ﬁrm 1’s output and an increase in the outputs of the other
downstream ﬁrms improve welfare because the other ﬁrms are more eﬃcient than ﬁrm 1
(total production costs are economized). This eﬀect is known as the welfare-improving
production substitution eﬀect.10 Moreover, vertical separation decreases a (Proposition
1(ii)), resulting in a welfare gain. Although these two eﬀects improve welfare, vertical
separation induces a decrease in the total output, which reduces welfare. Thus, whether the
former welfare-improving eﬀect dominates the latter welfare-reducing eﬀect is ambiguous.
When n > 3, the welfare implication of vertical separation becomes further complicated.
Suppose that c · 0. Given a, vertical separation reduces ﬁrm 1’s output and increases the
other ﬁrms’ outputs. However, because it reduces the total output, it reduces welfare as in
the case where n · 3. According to Proposition 1(iv), if c · 0, vertical separation decreases
a when n > 3, which results in a welfare gain. Thus, whether the latter welfare-improving
eﬀect dominates the former welfare-reducing eﬀect is ambiguous.
We now specify L(a) = Áa2=2 and present a numerical result where Á is a positive
constant. Suppose that c = 0. Figure 2 indicates the condition wherein vertical separation
reduces welfare. This ﬁgure indicates that when n or Á is large, vertical separation improves
welfare.
10 See Lahiri and Ono (1988, 1998, 1999). Production substitution plays a crucial role in the discussions
on public policies. See, among others, Ono (1990), Ushio (2000), Matsushima (2001), Matsumura (2003),
Matsushima and Matsumura (2003), and Ishida et al. (2010).
12[Figure 2 here]
The larger the value of n, the weaker the double marginalization eﬀect discussed above
(the welfare-reducing eﬀect of vertical separation). Thus, vertical separation is more likely
to improve welfare when n is larger. The larger the value of Á, the larger the lobbying cost
L(a) = Áa2=2, given a ﬁxed a. Although the absolute values of aI and aS decrease with Á,
the diﬀerence between aI and aS aﬀects the welfare diﬀerence between the two cases (note
that aI > aS). Thus, vertical separation is more likely to improve welfare when Á is large.
Remark In our model, vertical separation reduces welfare when c · 0 and n · 3 (Propo-
sition 2). However, we should not excessively emphasize this result. We have assumed that
the facility ﬁrms in the two cases have the same manipulation cost function L(a): This as-
sumption may not be realistic. Under vertical separation, the cost structure becomes more
transparent and the disintegrated upstream ﬁrm faces more diﬃculties in manipulating the
accounting costs. In such situations, the access charge is lower than that predicted by our
model. Thus, our model might underestimate the gains from vertical separation.
4 Free entry
In the previous section, the number of ﬁrms in the product market is given exogenously.
However, if we consider the entries of independent ﬁrms, the results may change. Under
vertical separation, the separated facility ﬁrm has an incentive to reduce the access charge
in order to stimulate new entries. On the contrary, the integrated facility ﬁrm has an
opposite strategic incentive. It strategically increases the access charge in order to deter
further entries. Thus, if we consider a possible further new entry, vertical separation might
reduce the access charge even when the incumbent is as eﬃcient as the new entrants. In
this section, we examine this problem.11
11 In this paper, we consider the situation in which a is determined before entry. If a is determined after
entry, the basic principle discussed in the previous section can also apply to the free-entry market case. Thus,
vertical separation can either increase or decrease the access charge, depending on the relative production
13We now consider a case in which new entrants freely enter the market after the value
of a is determined. The input price a is common among the ﬁnal product suppliers. Let F
be the entry cost of each new entrant. We assume that c <
p
F. Otherwise, the incumbent
exits from the ﬁnal product market in both the vertical integration case and the vertical
separation case; thus, vertical separation never aﬀects the equilibrium access charge.12
Vertical integration We consider the vertical integration case with free-entry. First,
we consider the equilibrium in the second stage (quantity competition stage). The resulting
equilibrium outputs and proﬁts are the same as ﬁxed n case except that (i = 2;3;:::;n)
¼IS
i =
(v ¡ 2a + c)2
(n + 1)2 ¡ F;
where F is the entry cost of each independent ﬁrm. From the free-entry condition (zero-
proﬁt condition), we have the equilibrium number of ﬁrms:
n =










F + (a ¡ c); yIS
i =
p















F ¡ c)2 + (v ¡ c)a ¡ a2 ¡ L(a):
Second, we consider the ﬁrst stage. The integrated facility ﬁrm maximizes ¼IS
1 with




= v ¡ c ¡ 2a ¡ L0(a) = 0: (4)
Let the superscript I denote the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes under
vertical integration. aI is derived from (4).
eﬃciency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the entry cost that aﬀects the equilibrium
number of entrants.
12 Under vertical separation, we can see this from y
SS
1 in (5). Under vertical integration, we can show
that exiting from the ﬁnal product market before the entry of rival ﬁrms increases the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1 if and
only if c ¸
p
F. Thus, even here, ﬁrm 1 is not active in the ﬁnal product market.
14Vertical separation We consider the vertical separation case with free-entry. Fist, we
consider the equilibrium outcome in the second stage. The resulting equilibrium outputs
and proﬁts are the same as ﬁxed n case except for (i = 2;3;:::;n)
¼SS
i =
(v + c ¡ a)2
(n + 1)2 ¡ F:
From the free-entry condition, we have the equilibrium number of ﬁrms:
n =










F ¡ c; ySS
i =
p




0 = (v ¡
p
F ¡ a)a ¡ L(a); ¼SS
1 = (
p









F ¡ c)2 + (v ¡
p
F)a ¡ a2 ¡ L(a):







F ¡ 2a ¡ L0(a) = 0: (6)
Let the superscript S denote the SPNE outcomes under vertical separation. aS is derived
from (6).
Because we assume that c <
p
F, from (4) and (6), we have the following proposition:13
Proposition 3 aS < aI. That is, the input price decrease under vertical separation.
Under free-entry, an additional strategic eﬀect emerges. Under vertical integration, a higher
input price diminishes the incentive of the new entrants to enter the market. This higher
price protects the integrated downstream incumbent. Thus, the integrated facility ﬁrm has
a strong incentive to raise a. This strategic eﬀect disappears under vertical separation. In
addition, under vertical separation, the separated facility ﬁrm has the opposite incentive.
In the free-entry market, a reduction in a stimulates new entries and increases the aggregate
quantity supplied. Thus, the separated facility ﬁrm has a weaker incentive to raise a.
13 As is noted in the second paragraph of this section, a
S = a




Firms often inﬂuence the access charge by lobbying and/or manipulating the accounting
costs in practice, whereas the rule for calculating the access charge is determined by a
neutral government, and there is no room for manipulation in principle. In this paper, we
consider a situation wherein the access charge is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrms through lobbying
activities. Under the situation, we mainly discuss the manner in which vertical separation
aﬀects the access charge. We ﬁnd that it is ambiguous as to whether or not vertical
separation decreases the lobbying activities and consequently lowers the access charge.
When the number of new entrants is large (small) and the incumbent is as eﬃcient as the
new entrants, vertical separation decreases (increases) the access charge. We also ﬁnd that
vertical separation can be harmful for welfare. In free-entry markets, however, the result
of the equilibrium access charge is clearer. Vertical separation always decreases lobbying
activities and consequently lowers the equilibrium access charge.
In this paper, we assume that the lobbying function is given exogenously and investi-
gate whether or not vertical separation reduces the incentive to lobby. Endogenizing the
relationship between lobbying activity and the resulting access charge under vertical inte-
gration and vertical separation and/or introducing lobbying by multiple players remains an
interesting topic for future research.
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19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 First, we show (ii). Given a, the diﬀerence between @¼SS
0 =@a
in (3) and @¼IS
1 =@a in (2) is given as
D ´ ¡
(n ¡ 3)(v ¡ nc ¡ 2a)
(n + 1)2 :
If n = 3, D = 0 regardless of the parameters. This implies aS = aI:
Next, we show (i) and (iii). We show the following three properties:
(a) @¯ ¼IS
1 =@a = @¯ ¼SS
0 =@a = (n ¡ 1)c when a = (v ¡ nc)=2;
(b) @2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2 < 0 and @2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2 < 0;
(c) @2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2 < @2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2 holds if n < 3,
@2¯ ¼IS
1 =@a2 > @2¯ ¼SS
0 =@a2 holds if n > 3.
If the three properties hold, from Figure 1, it is clear that Proposition 1(i) and Proposition
1(iii) hold.
We ﬁrst show that (a) holds. @¯ ¼IS
1 =@a and @¯ ¼SS





2(n ¡ 1)(v ¡ nc + (n ¡ 1)a)
(n + 1)2 +







nv ¡ c ¡ 2na
n + 1
:
Substituting a = (v¡nc)=2 into these two equations yields @¯ ¼IS
1 =@a = @¯ ¼SS
0 =@a = (n¡1)c.
This implies (a).
Second, we show that (b) holds. Diﬀerentiating @¯ ¼IS
1 =@a and @¯ ¼SS





2(n ¡ 1)(n + 3)








Finally, we show that (c) holds. The diﬀerence between @2¯ ¼IS

























(a) c is large, n = 2
L0(a) L0(a)
(b) c is large, n > 3















(c) c is small, n = 2
L0(a) L0(a)
(d) c is small, n > 3
aS aI aI aS
M M
Figure 1: The marginal gain and cost of raising a.
Horizontal axis: The access charge level, a,
Vertical axis: The marginal gain and cost of raising a, @¼
IS




M: The intersection of the two curves, (a;@¯ ¼=@a) = ((v ¡ nc)=2;(n ¡ 1)c).






Figure 2: The condition wherein vertical separation reduces welfare
Horizontal axis: The number of ﬁrms (n),
Vertical axis: The parameter of the investment function (Á),
Shaded area is that the condition holds.
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